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Attorney General Robert
Jackson’s Brief Encounter with
the Notion of Preclusive
Presidential Power
William R. Casto*
Justice Robert H. Jackson‟s concurring opinion in the Steel
Seizure case1 is the best judicial2 opinion ever written on the
vexing question of the President‟s constitutional power over
foreign affairs.3 His opinion does not resolve specific problems
that arise, but it provides a valuable framework for organizing
analyses.
The opinion has become the most influential
pronouncement on the concurrent foreign affairs powers of the
President and Congress.4 His analysis in Steel Seizure drew
* Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, Texas Tech University. The present
essay presents a small facet of my on-going, comprehensive study of the role
of attorneys in advising President Roosevelt on the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases
Deal.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
634 (1952).
2. An early essay by Alexander Hamilton is equally valuable. See
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Pacificus No. 1 (1793), in 15 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 40 (H. Syrett ed., 1969). See also WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL, at chs. 5, 10
(2006). Jackson‟s and Hamilton‟s essays, though separated by one and a half
centuries, mesh well together to form a complete understanding of the
allocation of foreign affairs powers under the Constitution. See id. at ch. 10.
This compatibility is not surprising. Jackson was a gifted Supreme Court
Justice, and by any standard, Hamilton was one of the five best
constitutional theorists in our nation‟s history. In my mind, Hamilton and
James Madison are at the top, with John Marshall very closely behind. As
for the next two, I will let the readers pick.
3. Jackson‟s model is ably discussed in MICHAEL GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 8-15 (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 94-96 (2d ed. 1996); and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 107-13 (1990).
4. “Justice Jackson‟s concurrence in Youngstown . . . has been very
influential. Indeed, courts and commentators often give more weight to
Jackson‟s concurrence than to the majority opinion.” CURTIS A. BRADLEY &
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 174 (2d ed. 2006). See also
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upon his practical experience as Attorney General of the
United States advising President Roosevelt on the eve of the
country‟s entrance into World War II.
Justice Jackson‟s most famous opinion as Attorney General
was his advice in the summer of 1940, that the President could
trade fifty over-age destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for
base rights in the West Indies and Canada.5 Jackson had to
navigate through a complex set of statutes specifically designed
to limit the transfer of warships to belligerent nations while
the United States was neutral. The political stakes in this
episode were high. President Roosevelt believed that Great
Britain‟s very survival was at stake and, perhaps with a smile, 6
told Jackson that if the legal problems were not cleared up,
Jackson‟s “head will have to fall.”7 At about this same time,
STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 47 (4th ed. 2006); THOMAS M.
FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 28 (2d ed. 1993); HENKIN, supra note 3, at 94. See, e.g., Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (“Justice Jackson‟s familiar tripartite scheme
provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this
area.”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981).
5. Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age
Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen. 484 (1940). DAVID REYNOLDS, THE CREATION OF
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE 1937-41: A STUDY IN COMPETITIVE
COOPERATION, at chs. 4, 5 (1982) is the best overall treatment of the deal
because Reynolds does a superb job of placing the deal in the overall context
of Anglo-American relations. Another excellent treatment that is especially
good in giving the reader the British perspective is JAMES R. LEUTZE,
BARGAINING FOR SUPREMACY: ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVAL COLLABORATION 19371941 (1977). Two valuable and more narrowly focused studies are PHILIP
GOODHART, FIFTY SHIPS THAT SAVED THE WORLD: THE FOUNDATION OF THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE (1965) and ROBERT SHOGAN, HARD BARGAIN: HOW
FDR TWISTED CHURCHILL‟S ARM, EVADED THE LAW, AND CHANGED THE ROLE OF
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1999). Shogan‟s Hard Bargain is thoroughly
researched and extremely well-grounded in original sources, but the author‟s
analysis is flawed by naïve understandings of politics and of law. WILLIAM L.
LANGER & S. EVERETT GLEASON, THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION, 1937-1940
(1952) is still valuable.
The recent chapter-length treatment in IAN
KERSHAW, FATEFUL CHOICES: TEN DECISIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD, 19401941, at ch. 5 (2007) is good but largely derivative. The treatment in
LLEWELLYN WOODWARD, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
84-92 (1962) is quite dry and relatively uninformative.
6. OWEN WISTER, THE VIRGINIAN: A HORSEMAN OF THE PLAINS 24 (1919)
(“When you call me that, smile.”).
7. Roosevelt told this to the Canadian Prime Minister in a telephone
conversation, and the Prime Minister recounted the story to U.S. Ambassador
Moffat that same day. Moffat recorded that the Prime Minister said that
Roosevelt assured him that:
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Jackson considered the idea that “In view of [the President‟s]
constitutional power as Chief Executive and as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy . . . the Congress could not by
statute limit [his] authority.”8 If this were so, there would be
no legal impediment to the transaction.
A little over a decade later, Justice Jackson wrote in Steel
Seizure that presidential actions related to foreign affairs could
be organized into three categories. In crafting these categories,
Jackson consciously drew upon his experiences as Attorney
General advising President Roosevelt.9 The first category
involves action taken “pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress.”10 In such a situation, lawful
presidential power “is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate.”11 When the President acts pursuant to congressional
authority, “the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation” would be used to support the
lawfulness of the President‟s actions.12
Jackson‟s second category recognizes the concept of
concurrent presidential and congressional authority.
If
Congress has neither delegated nor denied authority to the
[A] way out of legal difficulties, which had been blocking
him, had at last been found. At least if it hadn‟t, continued
the President, one of the heads now in the room (Attorney
General, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy and
the Acting Secretary of State) will have to fall.
46 JAY PIERREPONT MOFFAT, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS (Aug. 22, 1940) (on file with
Harvard College Library).
8. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion (Aug. 1940), in BENJAMIN V.
COHEN PAPERS, 1902-1983 (on file with the Library of Congress, Washington
D.C.), reprinted infra at app. pp. 383-95.
9. Jackson‟s opening sentence was clearly autobiographical: “That
comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical
advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has
served as legal advisor to a President in time of transition and public
anxiety.” Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
He continued, “While an interval of detached reflection,” i.e., about a decade,
“may temper teachings of that experience, they probably are a more realistic
influence on my views than the conventional materials of judicial decision
which seem unduly to accentuate doctrine and legal fiction.” Id. (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
11. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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President, “he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain.”13 Jackson confined his discussion of the second
category to a single, brief paragraph because he believed that
the President‟s action in Steel Seizure was contrary to the will
of Congress.14 In practice, this second category, or “zone of
twilight,” has become very significant.
Jackson‟s third category involves presidential “measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”15
In this situation, the President‟s “power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.”16 In other words, courts “can sustain exclusive
Presidential control in such a case only be disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject.”17
For many years, discussions of the president‟s
constitutional authority have centered upon Jackson‟s second
category to the virtual exclusion of his third category.18 In
recent years, however, the Bush II Administration‟s
pretentions to a broad expanse of plenary, unreviewable
constitutional power has sparked interest in the third category.
Professors David Barron and Martin Lederman have addressed
this issue with considerable thoughtfulness and care.19 They
followed Jackson‟s diction and described the range of plenary,
unreviewable presidential power as a preclusive authority.20
In 1940, a decade earlier, Jackson had to determine
whether Congress had authorized the President to sell the
destroyers to Great Britain. If so, the problem fit into the first
13. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
16. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
18. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 698-99 (2008).
19. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941
(2008); Barron & Lederman, supra note 18.
20. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution”); Barron & Lederman, supra note 18, at 720-29.
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Steel Seizure category, and therefore the President obviously
would have had authority to transfer them. But strong
arguments could be made that acts of Congress forbade the
transfer.21 Jackson later admitted, “I should readily agree that
a respectable argument against [my] conclusion could have
been made.”22 Such an interpretation would have moved the
problem into the third Steel Seizure category. If the President
has plenary constitutional authority over foreign affairs, which
the preliminary draft advanced, the President could ignore the
apparently applicable acts of Congress. This very argument of
plenary—indeed, dictatorial—powers has been more recently
advanced by attorneys advising President Bush.23
The present essay considers Attorney General Jackson‟s
encounter with plenary constitutional power in the Destroyersfor-Bases Deal. First, the essay describes the Deal‟s political
and diplomatic context.24 Next, the essay considers the legal
context in which the argument for plenary power occurred.25
Finally, the essay considers possible explanations for why
Jackson deleted the argument from his final opinion.26
AIDING GREAT BRITAIN
Although World War II began in Europe in the early fall of
1939, the German army did not bring its blitzkrieg to the
western front until the next summer. In May and June of
21. See Edwin Borchard, The Attorney General’s Opinion on the
Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT‟L L. 690 (1940); Herbert
W. Briggs, Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal, 34 AM. J. INT‟L L. 569
(1940); Edward Corwin, Letter to the Editor, Executive Authority Held
Exceeded in Destroyer Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1940, at 72. See also Letter
from Quincy Wright to Charles C. Burlingham (Aug. 21, 1940), in BENJAMIN
V. COHEN PAPERS, supra note 8.
22. Robert Houghwout Jackson, Untitled Preliminary Draft, at 47 (Oct.
10, 1952), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS (on file with the Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.).
23. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to
Combat Al-Qa’eda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces—The First Year, 30
PACE L. REV. 340, 342-53 (discussing Bush Administration policies on alQa‟eda, the Taliban, and associated forces). See also generally Steven D.
Schwinn, The State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE L. REV.
778 (2010).
24. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 34-92 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
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1940, the Wehrmacht quickly conquered the Low Countries
and France, and drove the British army from the continent. At
about the same time, Italy entered the war, and Great Britain
stood alone against “Hitler‟s gospel of hatred, appetite and
Many believed that Britain would either
domination.”27
28
negotiate a peace or be conquered through invasion.
Invasion seemed imminent, and only the English Channel,
patrolled by the Royal Navy, stood between Britain and the
triumphant Germans. At the same time, the Navy had to
protect shipping from submarine attacks.29 Destroyers were
absolutely essential to both of these tasks, and the British
simply did not have enough of them. Defending against an
invasion was the highest priority bar none, and the Admiralty
allocated a little more than half of their North Atlantic
destroyers to this task.30 This absolutely essential allocation
left too few destroyers to protect shipping.31
Almost as soon as Churchill became Prime Minister in the
middle of May, he began besieging President Roosevelt to lend
or sell destroyers to the British.32 In a “jigsaw puzzle”33 of

27. Winston Churchill, War of the Unknown Warrior Speech (BBC
television
broadcast,
July
14,
1940)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winstonchurchill/126-war-of-the-unknown-warriors). See also 2 CHURCHILL WAR
PAPERS 516-17 (Martin Gilbert ed., 1995).
28. The British Cabinet gave serious thought to a negotiated peace in
late May. See LEUTZE, supra note 5, at ch. 4; KERSHAW, supra note 5, at ch. 1;
REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 103-06.
29. See 1 S.W. ROSKILL, THE WAR AT SEA 1939-1945, at 249-57 (1954).
30. See id. at 249, 253. The British anticipated that destroyers would be
the primary weapon against a cross-channel invasion. Winston Churchill to
General Ironsides and General Gill (July 10, 1940), 2 CHURCHILL WAR
PAPERS, supra note 27, at 496.
31. Although the Germans had only a few U-boats operational in the
summer of 1940, their assault upon the relatively unprotected British
shipping was devastating. See ROSKILL, supra note 29, at 253, 348-52, 357.
The German U-boat veterans later remembered this short period as “the
happy time.” Id. at 348.
32. Telegram from Winston Churchill to Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(May 15, 1940), in 6 MARTIN GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR
1939-1941, at 346 (1983) (stating that “[i]mmediate needs are: [f]irst of all,
the loan of 40 or 50 of your older destroyers”).
33. Robert H. Jackson, The Exchange of Destroyers for Atlantic Bases
(1954), in THAT MAN: AN INSIDER‟S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 82,
82 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003). Jackson died before he could publish this
manuscript. It is reprinted in Professor Barrett‟s marvelous book.
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intricate discussions that lasted three months, Roosevelt
agreed to sell the British fifty destroyers for base rights.
Jackson‟s legal opinion was a sine qua non for the Deal, but the
opinion did not spring full-grown from his forehead.
THE LEGAL CONTEXT
In assessing the President‟s power, Jackson had to address
a number of related statutes that appeared to bar the deal. In
June, Jackson had given an informal opinion34 that a section of
the Espionage Act of 191735 forbade the transfer of twenty PT
boats to the British.36 Many people thought that the Espionage
Act similarly prohibited the transfer of destroyers.37
To complicate the matter further, when the planned PT
boat transfer came to light and rumors began circulating that
the government might also sell destroyers to the British,
Congress passed two statutes—the Walsh Amendment38 and
the Vinson Amendment39—to outlaw the contemplated
transfer.40 These two statutes, coupled with the Espionage Act,
led the President and his Cabinet to believe that the Destroyer
Deal would require specific congressional approval.41
34. Id. at 94.
35. Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 33 (1940), repealed 1948, re-codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 964
(2006)). The Espionage Act of 1917 originated as an “Omnibus Bill” that
collected many related and unrelated provisions dealing with war and
neutrality. See id. See also Letter from Lawrence Smith to Attorney General
Jackson (June 21, 1940), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS, supra note
22.
36. Jackson, supra note 22. Jackson‟s precise advice on the PT boat
transfer is in the Assistant Navy Secretary‟s notes of a telephone
conversation with Newman Townsend, Jackson‟s assistant. Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation Between Townsend and Acting Secretary Compton
(June 24, 1940) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, D.C.).
37. See WHITNEY SHEPARDSON & WILLIAM SCROGGS, THE UNITED STATES
IN WORLD AFFAIRS: AN ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1940, at
259 (1941). See also MARK LINCOLN CHADWIN, THE HAWKS OF WORLD WAR II,
at 87 (1968); H. DUNCAN HALL, NORTH AMERICAN SUPPLY 142 (1955).
38. An Act to Expedite National Defense, and for Other Purposes, Pub.
L. No. 76-671, § 14, 54 Stat. 676, 681 (1940).
39. Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-757, § 7, 54 Stat. 779, 780
(regarding the composition of the United States Navy).
40. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
41. Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt (Aug. 2, 1940), in 3
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1940, at 58
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Others believed that, notwithstanding the three statutes,
the President had unilateral authority to accomplish the
exchange. In early July, private citizens and Justice Felix
Frankfurter asked Benjamin V. Cohen to consider the issue.42
Cohen held a relatively obscure position in the Department of
the Interior,43 but he was generally considered the most
brilliant lawyer in government.44 Jackson described him as
“having the best legal brain he ha[d] ever come in contact
with.”45 Cohen wrote a long memorandum presenting a buffet
of powerful and not so powerful legal analyses supporting the
transfer of destroyers to Britain.46 The President, however,
initially rejected Cohen‟s arguments.47
On August 2, Roosevelt and his Cabinet reached a policy
consensus that the fifty destroyers should be transferred to the
British, but they still believed that legislative action would be
necessary.48
To break this logjam, Justice Frankfurter
arranged for Cohen and Dean Acheson to refine and polish
Cohen‟s original memorandum.49 Acheson was a capable
attorney in private practice who later became Secretary of

(U.S. Department of State ed., 1958) [hereinafter 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS].
42. See CHADWIN, supra note 37, at 89, 97.
43. He was General Counsel of the National Power Policy Committee.
See WILLIAM LASSER, BENJAMIN V. COHEN: ARCHITECT OF THE NEW DEAL 3,
107, 247 (2002).
44. See id. at 3.
45. 3 HAROLD ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE
LOWERING CLOUDS, 1939-1941, at 656 (1954) (June 22, 1941 entry quoting
Jackson). Similarly, New Dealer and later Supreme Court Justice William O.
Douglas had thought that “Ben was the best and most intelligent man in the
New Deal.” WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS
369 (1974).
46. Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen Regarding Sending Effective
Material Aid to Great Britain with Particular References to the Sending of
Destroyers (July 20, 1940), in FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT PAPERS (on file
with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde
Park, N.Y.) [hereinafter Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen].
47. See Letter from President Roosevelt to Navy Secretary Knox (July
22, 1940), in 2 F.D.R.: HIS PERSONAL LETTERS 1928-1945, at 1048-49 (Elliot
Roosevelt ed., 1950).
48. See LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 5, at 749-51.
49. DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 222 (1965); BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 210 (1982) (discussing a
Benjamin Cohen interview).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15

8

372

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

State.50 The two men went to work, and on August 11,
published their redraft in the New York Times.51 As soon as
the Cohen/Acheson letter appeared, Jackson asked Assistant
Solicitor General Newman A. Townsend52 to brief the letter,
and two days later, Townsend told Jackson that he was
“inclined to agree with the construction which the Times article
gives to . . . the Espionage Act.”53 Townsend also thought,
notwithstanding the Vinson and Walsh Amendments, that the
destroyers could be sold under Sections 491 and 492 of Title 34
of the United States Code.54 Jackson then gave the President a
tentative green light to transfer the destroyers without specific
legislative approval,55 and the President made a tentative offer
to the British that same day.56
JACKSON‟S OPINION
Jackson informally advised President Roosevelt that the
deal could be consummated without specific congressional
approval, and the United States concluded a formal agreement
with Great Britain on September 2.57 Jackson‟s formal opinion,
50. See DAVID MCLELLAN, DEAN ACHESON: THE STATE DEPARTMENT YEARS
(1976).
51. Dean Acheson et.al., Letter to the Editor, No Legal Bar Seen to
Transfer of Destroyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1940, at 58. Cohen did not sign
the Times letter. Instead, it was signed by Acheson and three other members
of the WASP establishment, Charles C. Burlingham, Thomas D. Thacher,
and George Rublee. Id.
52. Jackson described Townsend as “a hard-headed, conservative, and
forthright former judge.” Jackson, supra note 33, at 95.
53. Memorandum from Newman A. Townsend to the Attorney General
Regarding Over-Age Destroyers (Aug. 13, 1940), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT
JACKSON PAPERS, supra note 22 [hereinafter Memorandum from Newman A.
Townsend].
54. Id. With regard to Sections 491 and 492, Townsend wrote, “It may
be, however, that immediate release and sale of the over-age destroyers could
be accomplished under sections 491 and 492 of title 34, U.S.C.” Id.
55. Jackson later wrote that on the same day, “I advised the president of
Judge Townsend‟s conclusion, which seemed to me sound.” Jackson, supra
note 22, at 30-31. Jackson‟s final draft of this sentence reads, “Of course, I
told the President of this development.” Jackson, supra note 33, at 96.
56. GILBERT, supra note 32, at 732-33.
57. The agreement was accomplished through an exchange of notes
between the British Ambassador and the Secretary of State.
See
Memorandum from British Ambassador to Secretary of State (Sept. 2, 1940),
in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 41, at 73; Memorandum from Secretary
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which he finished at the end of the month, began with the
technical issue of whether the President had authority to
acquire the offered bases. In this regard, no act of Congress
gave the President authority, and no Act barred the President
from acquiring the bases. Using Jackson‟s subsequent Steel
Seizure analysis, the issue of the President‟s authority to
acquire base rights fell into the second category or “zone of
twilight.” In this context, a Preliminary Draft of the opinion58
argues that the President has a general constitutional
authority to act in the field of foreign relations as he sees fit.
“Eminent authorities,” the draft states, “have long held that in
the field of foreign relations the Executive‟s power is both
complete and exclusive.”59 To support this proposition, the
draft quotes Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, President
Theodore Roosevelt, Professor John Pomeroy, and Chief Justice
John Marshall, followed by a daunting string cite of fifteen
relevant—and not so relevant—books, debates, a law review
article, and a case.60 This portion of the Preliminary Draft
concludes with a quotation from Justice Sutherland‟s CurtissWright opinion.61 Except for the draft‟s loose reference to a
“complete and exclusive” presidential power, this first part of
the draft is uncontroversial. To repeat, this portion deals with
the “zone of twilight” in which there is no conflict between the
President and Congress.62
of State to British Ambassador (Sept. 2, 1940), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 41, at 74 (1958).
58. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8. See app. infra
at pp. 383-395.
59. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8; app. infra at
pp. 383-84.
60. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8; app. infra at
pp. 384-88.
61. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8; app. infra at
note 124 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319 (1936)).
62. Almost a year later, Jackson considered whether the President could
authorize the Army Air Corps to train British military flying students.
Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att‟y Gen.
58 (1941). In that context, he quoted a constitutional law treatise that
addressed the President‟s authority as Commander-in-Chief:
[I]n virtue of his rank as head of the forces, he has certain
powers and duties with which Congress cannot interfere.
For instance, he may regulate the movements of the army

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15

10

374

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

Although Congress had not spoken to the issue of the
President‟s authority to acquire territory, it clearly had
addressed the President‟s authority to dispose of Navy vessels.
The Walsh and Vinson Amendments were enacted specifically
to restrict the President‟s authority to transfer destroyers to
the British.63 The Walsh Amendment forbade a transfer unless
the destroyers were not essential to national defense.64 The
Vinson Amendment provided that “No [Navy] vessel . . . shall
be disposed of by sale or otherwise . . . except as now provided
by law,”65 and the Amendment‟s clear legislative history
limited the President‟s authority to two specific statutory
and the stationing of them at various posts. So also he may
direct the movements of the vessels of the navy, sending
them wherever in his judgment it is expedient.
Id. at 61 (quoting HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115 (3d ed. 1910)). In support of this proposition, Mr.
Black, who incidentally was the original author of Black’s Law Dictionary,
offered three obscure opinions from the United States Court of Claims.
BLACK, supra, at 115 n.15. In Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173 (1893),
the court held that the President had implied constitutional authority to
convene a military court martial, and noted that Congress had not sought to
deprive the President of this convening authority. The other two cases Black
cited were “see also” authority, in which the court gave little or no express
consideration to the possibility of implied power, and simply enforced the
applicable acts of Congress. See id. (citing Hogan v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl.
158 (1909); Cloud v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 69 (1907)).
Notwithstanding the quotation from Black, there was not the slightest
hint of a collision of congressional and presidential wills in the pilot-training
situation. Jackson pointed out that the recently enacted Lend-Lease Act, Act
of Mar. 11, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941), clearly gave the
President authority to use military equipment to train the British pilots, but
was technically silent on providing instruction services rather than training
equipment. Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op.
Att‟y Gen. at 60-61. He also noted the Act‟s legislative history that included a
clear statement that “our national policy is and should be . . . for our national
security, to aid Britain.” Id. at 62 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 77-18, at 2 (1941)).
In other words, the Pilot Training issue involved a situation in which the
President was proposing to act in accord with very recently stated
congressional policy. Therefore, the case fell within category two of Jackson‟s
subsequent Steel Seizure model, or perhaps even within category one.
Jackson stated in this regard, “I am inclined to the opinion that such action is
likewise authorized by the Lend-Lease Act.” Id. at 60-61. See also id. at 6263 (presenting a strong statutory basis for Jackson‟s inclination).
63. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
64. An Act to Expedite National Defense, and for Other Purposes, Pub.
L. No. 76-671, § 14(a), 54 Stat. 676, 681 (1940).
65. Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-757, § 7, 54 Stat. 779, 780 (1940).
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modes of sale.66 The first was Sections 491 and 492 of Title 34
of the United States Code, which allowed the Navy to strike
“vessels . . . unfit for further service” from the Navy List and
sell them.67 The second was Section 493, which allowed the
Navy to sell auxiliary vessels “unsuited to the present needs of
the Navy.”68
When Jackson initially gave President Roosevelt a
tentative green light to transfer the destroyers without specific
congressional authorization, he planned to use Sections 491
and 492.69 This initial plan, however, fell completely apart
when the Chief of Naval Operations refused to certify that the
destroyers were “unfit for further service” as required by
Section 491.70 Jackson‟s fall-back position was to rely solely
upon Section 492.71 The Preliminary Draft, which is the
subject of the present essay, was written after the Chief of
Naval Operations refused to go along with the idea of striking
the destroyers from the naval list.72 Jackson‟s sole reliance
66. S. REP. NO. 76-1946, at 7-8 (1940). Accord Memorandum from
Newman A. Townsend, supra note 53.
67. 34 U.S.C. §§ 491-92 (1940). In 1956, Congress repealed Title 34,
which dealt solely with the Navy, and merged the repealed provisions into
Title 10, which deals with all the armed forces. Citations to Title 34 in the
present article refer to the 1940 edition of the United States Code.
68. Id. § 493. See also supra note 67. In fact, the Navy never used
Section 493 to dispose of even auxiliary vessels. See Diary of Oscar Cox (July
12, 1940), in OSCAR COX PAPERS (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, N.Y.) (relating advice from
Admiral Ray Spear).
69. See LEUTZE, supra note 5, at 117-19. See also Memorandum
Regarding Old Destroyers (Aug. 15, 1940), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON
PAPERS, supra note 22. The memorandum is unsigned but was likely written
by Newman A. Townsend and Green Hackworth. Hackworth was the Legal
Advisor to the Department of State. For support of Townsend‟s and
Hackworth‟s likely authorship of the memorandum, see Jackson, supra note
33, at 96.
70. Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations Stark to Navy
Secretary Knox, with Addenda (Aug. 17, 1940), discussed in LEUTZE, supra
note 5, at 117-19. Apparently, this valuable memorandum was lost in the
mid-1990s, when the Chief of Naval Operation‟s files for 1938-41 were
transferred from the U.S. Naval Historical Center to the National Archives.
See SHOGAN, supra note 5, at 298 n.216.
71. See infra app. at pp. 390-92. Accord Acquisition of Naval and Air
Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen. 484, 489
(1940).
72. The Preliminary Draft is based solely upon Section 492, but cites
both Sections 491 and 492. See infra app. at p. 392. Someone later noticed
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upon Section 492 was, at best, dubious. Until Chief of Naval
Operations Stark refused to go along with Jackson‟s initial
approach, every lawyer who considered the issue, including
Jackson himself, believed that Section 492 could not be used
unless the ships were struck from the Navy List.73 Whoever
put together the Preliminary Draft undoubtedly understood the
weaknesses of the Section 492 argument and in the analysis of
the Espionage Act. Accordingly, the drafter prefaced his
analysis with the thought that: “In view of your constitutional
power as Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy, many authorities hold that the Congress could
not by statute limit your authority in this respect. I find it
unnecessary, however, to pass upon that question.”74 It is
unclear who came up with this claim of preclusive authority.
Jackson‟s notes for his unpublished law review article suggest
that the general idea came from Secretary of War Stimson.75
The basic problem with the Preliminary Draft‟s claim of
preclusive power is that the authorities quoted or cited in the
draft gave scant support to the proposition. To be sure, the
President clearly has exclusive power over a few specific
foreign affairs issues.
Under the Constitution, only the
President may nominate officers subject to Senate
confirmation,76 and only the President may negotiate treaties,
subject of course, to Senate approval.77 There also is a
this discrepancy and struck Section 491 from the draft.
73. Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen, supra note 46, at 2;
Memorandum from Newman A. Townsend, supra note 53. For Jackson‟s
initial position, see supra notes 52-56, 69-71 and accompanying text. When
Cohen and Acheson wrote their letter, they struck all reference to Sections
491 and 492, presumably because they believed that a finding that the ships
were “unfit for further service” was impossible. See Acheson et al., supra
note 51.
74. See infra app. at p. 390.
75. In some preliminary notes, Jackson wrote, “The opinion -- not rest on
Stimson ground inherent power -- Letter of five -- Statutory only . . . Domestic
law -- not go on inherent powers -- no danger.” Untitled preliminary notes for
law review article, in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS, supra note 22.
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. One of the sources cited in the
Preliminary Draft notes this particular exclusive power. See Warren, infra
app. note 119.
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. A number of the sources cited in the
Preliminary Draft adduced the President‟s treaty power as an example of
exclusive executive power. See HYDE, infra app. note 114; MOORE, infra app.
note 117; POMEROY, infra app. note 108; WILLOUGHBY, infra app. note 121;
WRIGHT, infra app. note 122.
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consensus that the President has exclusive power to recognize
foreign governments.78 These narrow categories, however, are
based upon specific constitutional language and in no way
support a general constitutional authority to ignore
congressional mandates. There also is a consensus that only
the President may communicate officially with foreign
governments,79 but this is a rule of procedure and not a
substantive Presidential power. At best, the Preliminary
Draft‟s quotation of the Curtiss-Wright case supports this
procedural power.80 One of the quoted authorities81 embraced a
broad preclusive power stemming from the Commander in
Chief Clause,82 but the Preliminary Draft takes no notice of
this separate argument.83
The long list of authorities cited in the Preliminary Draft
was initially adduced in support of the President‟s unilateral
power to acquire base rights, and there was no relevant act of
Congress on this issue. In Jackson‟s Steel Seizure opinion, he
later referred to this type of issue as a “zone of twilight” in
which the President and Congress may have concurrent
authority. A number of the authorities in the Preliminary
Draft relied upon occasions in which Presidents took bold
action in the absence of congressional guidance.84 President
Jefferson‟s Louisiana Purchase85 and President Lincoln‟s
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. A number of the sources cited in the
Preliminary Draft adduced the President‟s recognition power as an example
of exclusive executive power. See WILLOUGHBY, infra app. note 121; WRIGHT,
infra app. note 122; Warren, infra app. note 119. See also MOORE, infra app.
note 117.
79. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 41-45, 81-82. A number of the sources
cited in the Preliminary Draft adduced the President‟s power to communicate
officially with foreign nations as an example of exclusive executive power.
See CORWIN, infra app. note 111; MATHEWS, infra app. note 116; MOORE, infra
app. note 117; POMEROY, infra app. note 108; WILLOUGHBY, infra app. note
121; WRIGHT, infra app. note 122; Warren, infra app. note 119. See also
HAMILTON, supra note 2; CASTO, supra note 2, at 62-63 (discussing Hamilton‟s
Pacificus No. 1).
80. See infra app. note 124 and accompanying text.
81. See POMEROY, infra app. note 108 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
83. See infra app. note 108 and accompanying text.
84. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804) (discussed infra app. note
123); DE CHAMBRUN, infra app. note 109; LATANÉ, infra app. note 115;
ROOSEVELT, infra app. note 107.
85. See LATANÉ, infra app. note 115.
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actions at the onset of the Civil War86 were particularly
dramatic examples. None of the authorities, however, support
a general Presidential power to ignore acts of Congress.87 Even
with respect to the dramatic actions of Presidents Jefferson
and Lincoln, the authorities note that each President sought
The Draft‟s
and obtained congressional ratification.88
prominent quotation from President Theodore Roosevelt ends
with the clear statement that he could not take action that
“was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.”89 In this
context, the President clearly meant “laws” to encompass acts
of Congress.90
About a week after the Preliminary Draft was prepared,
Jackson gave President Roosevelt a near-final draft for
review.91 This draft deleted almost all of the authorities on
presidential power that were quoted and cited in the
Preliminary Draft, but retained the argument of a general
foreign affairs power relevant to the President‟s authority to
acquire base rights.
To repeat, however, the issue of
concurrent authority to acquire base rights spoke to the second
Steel Seizure category in which there was no conflict between
the President and Congress. When Jackson turned to the
President‟s authority to dispose of the vessels, the idea of a
general presidential authority to ignore congressional
directives was completely gone.
Although Jackson dropped the suggestion of a broad claim
of preclusive presidential power, we do not know why he did so.
Perhaps he wished to avoid a political dispute with Congress.
Congressional relations were certainly a consideration, but
Jackson did not drop a somewhat similar, in-your-face,
86. See DE CHAMBRUN, infra app. note 109.
See also Barron &
Lederman, supra note 19, at 993-1005.
87. See infra app. notes 106-23.
88. See DE CHAMBRUN, infra app. note 109; LATANÉ, infra app. note 115.
In Steel Seizure, Jackson wrote that “The oft-cited Louisiana Purchase had
nothing to do with the separation of powers as between the President and
Congress, but only with the state and federal power.” Steel Seizure, 343 U.S.
579, 638 n.5 (1952).
89. See ROOSEVELT, infra app. note 107 and accompanying text.
90. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1035.
91. Robert Houghwout Jackson, Draft Opinion Regarding the Sale of
Over-Age Destroyers to Great Britain (Aug. 23, 1940), in ROBERT
HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS, supra note 22. See also Jackson, supra note 33
at 97-98.
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argument from the near-final draft opinion that he showed the
President.92
Seven years later, when he was on the Supreme Court,
Jackson evinced a deep, personal mistrust of broad
interpretations of war powers. He bluntly explained that,
No one will question that this power is the
most dangerous one to free government in the
whole catalogue of powers. It usually is invoked
in haste and excitement when calm legislative
consideration of constitutional limitation is
difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic
fervor that makes moderation unpopular.93
We may reasonably assume that Jackson would have been
leery of a constitutional doctrine that would eviscerate the
doctrine of separation of powers when the Executive invokes
the President‟s foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chief
powers. In Steel Seizure, he denied that his Destroyers-for92. In dealing with the Espionage Act, Benjamin Cohen had concluded
that, because the Act was a criminal statute whose terms did not expressly
apply to government action, the Act should be limited to private citizens.
Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen, supra note 46, at 11-12. There was
good precedent for this interpretive strategy, and some very sophisticated
people believed that Cohen‟s approach was the strongest argument. See
Quincy Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain, 34 AM. J. INT‟L L.
680, 683-84 (1940); Letter from Manley Hudson to Charles Burlingham (Nov.
12, 1940), in BENJAMIN V. COHEN PAPERS, supra note 8. See also James W.
Ryan, Address to the American Bar Association Section of International Law
(Sept. 10, 1940), in 86 CONG. REC. app. 5600-01 (1940).
In late August, Benjamin Cohen wrote, “I wholly agree that the
[Espionage Act] does not prevent sending the destroyers out of the country by
the Government itself.” Draft Letter sent as an attachment from Benjamin
Cohen to Dean Acheson (Aug. 27, 1940), in BENJAMIN COHEN PAPERS, supra
note 8 [hereinafter Draft Letter from Benjamin Cohen]. Cohen went on to
explain that he and Acheson deleted this argument from their N.Y. Times
letter, see Acheson et al., supra note 51; supra note 48 and accompanying
text, because this “view seemed to us calculated to produce the protest that
we were putting the Government above the law and suggesting that it do
what its citizens were forbidden to do.” Draft Letter from Benjamin Cohen,
supra. See also Letter from Benjamin Cohen to Dean Acheson (Aug. 17,
1940), in BENJAMIN COHEN PAPERS, supra note 8 (stating that “we feared [this
view] might provoke more political as well as legal protest than the
suggestion we made”).
93. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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Bases opinion relied upon preclusive presidential authority94
and restated his mistrust of broad war powers:
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate
would seem to me more sinister and alarming
than that a President whose conduct of foreign
affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even
is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over
the internal affairs of the country by his own
commitment of the Nation‟s armed forces to some
foreign venture.95
Finally, Jackson‟s response to Professor Edward Corwin‟s
critique of Jackson‟s final and official Destroyer opinion casts
some light on the matter. On the narrow issue of presidential
authority to acquire bases, Jackson quoted the Curtiss-Wright
dictum, recognizing a “very delicate, plenary, and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal
Government in the field of international relations—a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress.”96 In a fit of near hysteria, Corwin shrieked, “[n]o
such dangerous opinion was ever before penned by an Attorney
General of the United States.”97 He asked, “why may not any
and all of the Congress‟s specifically delegated powers be set
aside . . . and the country be put on a totalitarian basis without
further ado?”98 Of course, Jackson made no such claim. His
discussion of the President‟s constitutional power dealt solely
with an issue in which there was not the slightest hint of a
conflict between the President and the Congress. Corwin
simply misread Jackson‟s opinion.99
94. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 645 n.14 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson was referring to
President Truman‟s unilateral commitment of the armed forces to the Korean
War.
96. Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age
Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen. 484, 486 (1940) (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)). See also infra app.
at note 124 and accompanying text.
97. Corwin, supra note 21.
98. Id.
99. Although Corwin was a great scholar, he was not a careful reader of
legal texts. For another failure by Corwin to understand an important legal
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A decade later, Jackson still remembered, and obviously
resented, Corwin‟s strident attack. Although the Preliminary
Draft of the Destroyers opinion had included a claim similar to
Corwin‟s allegation, this extreme language was stripped from
the final opinion. In an early draft of Jackson‟s law review
article, he bluntly stated in specific response to Corwin‟s
charges, that “[t]he fact was that the opinion expressly avoided
reliance for its conclusion on inherent, implied or independent
constitutional powers of the presidential office . . . . The ruling
was that he could go as far as Congress authorized and no
farther.”100
CONCLUSION
As the Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s opinion in the
Destroyer Deal demonstrates, the idea of a broad, preclusive
Executive power based upon the President‟s foreign affairs and
Commander-in-Chief powers has been around for a long time.
Not until recently, however, has a high officer in the federal
government formally embraced this sweeping concept.
Certainly the idea did not reach the final draft of Jackson‟s
opinion. Why did Jackson not use the preclusive power
argument in his final opinion? Undoubtedly, there were
political reasons.
After all, the opinion was a political
document.101 But Jackson had to have had serious legal
reservations as well.
Not a single source cited in the Preliminary Draft—neither
the quotations nor the hideous string cite—supported the
claimed general principle of preclusive power. Indeed, some of
the sources flatly denied the principle. During the undeclared
naval war with France, the Supreme Court held that, in the
context of a direct conflict between an act of Congress and a
presidential order, that the Congress could micromanage a

argument, see CASTO, supra note 2, at 68-74, 179-80.
100. Jackson, supra note 22. Jackson subsequently deleted this section
from his draft. Presumably he wisely decided not to engage in polemics with
his critics.
101. In Steel Seizure, Jackson later confessed that one of his Attorney
General advisory opinions was “partisan advocacy.” Steel Seizure, 343 U.S.
579, 649 n.17 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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naval campaign.102 Likewise, the first President Roosevelt had
a quite expansive view of the President‟s constitutional powers,
but he clearly stated that the President‟s acts were subject to
congressional control.103

102. See infra app. note 123.
103. See ROOSEVELT, infra app. note 107 and accompanying text. See
also WRIGHT, infra app. note 122; infra app. note 122 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion104
The President
I have the honor to refer to your request for my opinion
concerning a question which has arisen in connection with a
proposed exchange of certain old destroyers of the United
States Navy for naval and air bases in the Western
Hemisphere.
I understand that the government of Great Britain has
proposed to grant to the United States seven naval and air
bases in the Western Hemisphere in exchange for fifty old
destroyers to be transferred by the United States to the
Canadian Government; and that the Chief of Naval Operations
of the United States Navy is of the opinion that due to the
strategic value of such naval and air bases the proposed
exchange will result in the strengthening of the total defense of
the United States. I also understand that the Chief of Naval
Operations has, or will, certify that in view of the acquisition of
such naval and air bases [and of their value in connection with
the national defense,]105 the destroyers which it is proposed to
exchange for them are not essential to the defense of the
United States. You request my opinion whether under these
circumstances you are authorized to direct the proper officials
of the United States Government to effect the exchange.
The Constitution vests the Executive power in the
President. (Const., Art. 2, sec. 1) Eminent authorities have
104. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8 (as reprinted
in this Appendix). The original document can be found in the Benjamin V.
Cohen Papers in the Library of Congress. All footnotes found within this
reprint of the Preliminary Draft are editorial inserts by the present author.
Cohen participated in drafting Attorney General Jackson‟s opinion. See
Jackson, supra note 33, at 96. The Preliminary Draft was prepared sometime
after August 16, 1940 and before August 27, 1940, when Jackson released his
final opinion. In order to establish the President‟s statutory authority to
transfer the destroyers, Jackson initially planned to rely upon Sections 491
and 492 of Title 34 of the United States Code. On August 16, however, the
Chief of Naval Operations refused to make a finding of fact crucial to
Jackson‟s original plan. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. The
Chief of Naval Operation‟s refusal forced Jackson to rely upon a much weaker
argument based solely upon a proviso to Section 492.
105. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
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long held that in the field of foreign relations the Executive‟s
power is both complete and exclusive. Thomas Jefferson said
that “The transaction of business with foreign nations is
Executive altogether.” (Writings of Thomas Jefferson
(Memorial Edition). Vol. III, p. 16)106 President Theodore
Roosevelt, in his autobiography (pp. 388-389),107 said:
*** My view was that every executive officer, and
above all every executive officer in high position,
was a steward of the people bound actively and
affirmatively to do all he could for the people,
and not to content himself with the negative
merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a
napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what
was imperatively necessary for the Nation could
not be done by the President unless he could find
some specific authorization to do it. My belief
was that it was not only his right but his duty to
do anything that the needs of the Nation
demanded unless such action was forbidden by
the Constitution or by the laws.
Professor Pomeroy, in his work entitled “Constitutional
Law of the United States (75th Ed., p.
),108 says:
106. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Question Whether the Senate
has the Right to Negative the Grade of Persons Appointed by the Executive to
Fill Foreign Missions, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 16 (Albert
Bergh ed., 1907). For the current edition, see 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 378, 379 (Julian Boyd ed., 1961). In this opinion, Jefferson simply
advised that the Senate, by itself, had no power to set the grade to which a
diplomat shall be appointed. The opinion is quite silent on the powers of the
Congress.
107. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1913). The last
sentence of the quotation makes clear that he is referring to an expansive
concurrent power that could not be exercised in violation of “the laws,” i.e.,
acts of Congress. Accord Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1034-37.
108. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 565 (10th ed. 1888). The draft‟s citation to the
seventy-fifth edition is a typo. The 1888 tenth edition is the last edition of
Pomeroy‟s book. The quoted language appears in Section 672 of the book,
and refers solely to the President‟s powers to communicate with foreign
nations and to negotiate treaties.
In other portions of his treatise, to which the Preliminary Draft neither cites
nor alludes, Pomeroy made sweeping claims of broad and unreviewable
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*** the Executive Department, by means of this
branch of its power over foreign relations, holds
in its keeping the safety, welfare, and even
permanence of our internal and domestic
institutions. And in wielding this power it is
untrammeled by any other department of the
Government; no other influence than a moral one
can control or curb it; its acts are political, and
its responsibility is only political.
In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall said:
*** the president is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of
which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience.
Other authority on this subject are Chambrun, The
Executive Power in the United States (1874), p.
;109
Conklin, The Power of the Executive Department (1866), p.
; 110Corwin, The President‟s Control of Foreign Relations
presidential power stemming from the Commander-in-Chief Clause. See id.
§§ 455-456, 703-706. See also Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1019-21
(discussing these sections). Pomeroy‟s analysis is highly suspect today
because it was based upon an unworkable assumption that all presidential
and congressional powers are mutually exclusive. See id. at 1019-20. Today,
and in Jackson‟s time, virtually everyone believes that the President and
Congress have significant powers that overlap each other. See HENKIN, supra
note 3, at 94.
109. ADOLPHE DE CHAMBRUN, THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (M. Dahlgren trans., 1874). De
Chambrun makes no reference to direct conflicts between the Congress and
the President. In the relevant portion of his text, he concentrates upon the
President‟s power to respond to foreign and domestic attacks. Id. at ch. 5.
He gives detailed attention to President Lincoln‟s unilateral response to the
beginning of the Civil War, but specifically notes that Lincoln‟s actions were
ratified by Congress. Id. at 120. See also id. at 122-23.
110. ALFRED CONKLING, THE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1866). Conkling makes no reference
to direct conflicts between the Congress and the President. He does not
discuss the President‟s foreign affairs powers but does discuss the President‟s
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(1917), p.
;111 Elliot‟s Debate, Vol. 4, p.
;112 Hamilton,
The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. 7, pp. 77-117;113 Hyde,
International Law, Vol. 2 (1922), p.
;114 Latané, American
115
;
Matthews, The Conduct of
Foreign Policy (1927), p.
Commander-in-Chief powers. Id. at 80-88. He further notes that his
discussion of these powers applies “only in war.” Id. at 83 (emphasis in
original). Even in time of war, Conkling makes no mention of a direct conflict
between the Congress and the President.
111. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT‟S CONTROL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS (1917). Corwin makes no reference to direct conflicts between the
President and the Congress. He does, however, emphatically state that “the
President is the organ of diplomatic intercourse with other states . . . [and]
this power is presumptively his alone . . . [and] his discretion in its discharge
is not legally subject to any other organ of government.” Id. at 35-36. There
is nothing in Corwin‟s book to indicate that the President‟s foreign affairs and
Commander-in-Chief powers cloak the Executive with a broad ranging
authority to disregard acts of Congress. When Jackson‟s final opinion was
published, Corwin misread the opinion as claiming such a power, and he
vehemently rejected the idea. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying
text.
112. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876). This
is a ridiculous throw-away cite. The author of the present essay is not aware
of any passages in the five volumes of Elliot’s Debates that speak directly to
an Executive power to ignore acts of Congress.
113. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Pacificus No. 1 (1793), in 7 THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 77-117 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851). Hamilton‟s
Pacificus No. 1 is a brilliant discussion of the President‟s broad, concurrent
powers in the realm of foreign affairs. See CASTO, supra note 2, at chs. 5, 10.
Hamilton did not even address the possibility of the President acting contrary
to an act of Congress, but did, however, note that, although the President had
a concurrent, unilateral power to declare neutrality, the President‟s
declaration would not be binding on the Congress. See HAMILTON, supra, at
75-76.
114. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES (1922). Professor Hyde
makes no mention of direct conflicts between the President and Congress. He
notes that the President has significant unilateral authority to enter into
agreements other than treaties with foreign countries. Id. §§ 505-09. He
does not suggest, however, that Congress cannot limit the President‟s
authority in this regard. Professor Hyde does note that only the President
and his agents may negotiate and ratify a treaty. Id. § 517.
115. JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
(1927). The only even barely relevant part of Professor Latané‟s history is his
mention that Thomas Jefferson approved the Louisiana Purchase
notwithstanding qualms that there was no constitutional authority for the
acquisition. Id. at 109-10. This political precedent was not strictly relevant
to the acquisition of bases because the Louisiana Purchase was submitted to
Congress and the Senate for approval. Id. at 110. Accord Acquisition of
Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen.
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American Foreign Relations (1922), p.
;116
Moore,
117
International Law Digest (1906), p.
;
Oppenheim,
International Law, 4th Ed. (McNair, 1926), Vol. 2, p.
;118
Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence (1930), p.
;119 Wheaton, International Law (6th English Ed., Keith,
1929), Vol. 2, p. ;120 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the

484, 488 (1940) (opinion written by Attorney General Jackson).
116. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS (1922). Professor Mathews makes no mention of a direct conflict
between the President and the Congress. He does explain that Congress has
typically deferred to the President in respect of foreign relations. See id. at 321. He also notes Representative John Marshall‟s argument that “The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign relations.” Id. at 22 (internal citation omitted).
Mathews limits the “sole organ” power, however, to communications between
the United States and foreign nations. See id. at 21-26 (quoting Marshall).
117. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906).
Professor Moore‟s work is what it says it is: a digest of various statements,
diplomatic and judicial precedents, and diplomatic incidents. He recites
various precedents on the President‟s power to recognize foreign states. Id.
at 243-48 (vol. I).
He does the same on the issue of who speaks
internationally for the United States. Id. at 680-83 (vol. IV). Finally, he
briefly covers the rule that the Executive negotiates treaties. Id. at 179-80
(vol. 5).
118. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Arnold McNair ed., 4th
ed. 1926). This was a leading treatise on international law and as such,
devoted virtually no space to domestic law issues like the allocation of power
within a particular country. Parts I and II of Volume Two deal with the
“Settlement of Disputes between States and with War.” Part III, on
“Neutrality,” was relevant to the legality of the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal
under international law, but offered no guidance whatsoever on the
President‟s powers under the Constitution.
119. Charles Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence, 10 B.U.
L. REV. 1 (1930). This interesting article by a gifted legal historian
documents numerous disputes between the President and Congress in
respect of foreign affairs issues. All the disputes involved fairly technical
issues such as the President as the sole organ of communications with foreign
governments, the President‟s exclusive power to nominate officers subject to
Senate confirmation, the President‟s exclusive power to recognize foreign
governments, and the President‟s power to control foreign service officers.
None of these disputes involved a general claim to ignore acts of Congress.
120. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (A. Berriedale
Keith ed., 6th ed. 1929). Wheaton‟s work is an international law treatise
organized much like Oppenheim‟s. See supra app. note 119. Chapters I-IV
deal with war and belligerents, Chapter V treats neutrality, and Chapters VI
and VII cover enforcement of the laws of war and peace treaties. Like
Oppenheim, Wheaton addresses international law principles relevant to the
transfer of the destroyers but is silent on the internal allocation of authority
within a country.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15

24

388

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

United States (2d Ed., 1929), Vol. 1, p.
;121
Wright,
122
Control of our Foreign Relations (1927), p.
;
Little v.
Barreme, 2 Cranch. 169.123
The principle announced by the above authorities was
aptly summarized by Mr. Justice Sutherland who, in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 3, held that the
121. 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929). Professor Willoughby makes no reference
to the idea that the President‟s foreign-affairs and commander-in-chief
powers include a general power to ignore acts of Congress. See Barron &
Lederman, supra note 19, at 1025 n.334. He does, however, point to some
limited instances where the President‟s power is usually deemed to be
exclusive and beyond formal congressional control. These include the
negotiation and ratification of Treaties, see WILLOUGHBY, supra, §§ 284, 289,
the recognition of foreign governments, id. § 293, and communications with
foreign governments, id. §§ 522, 537-38.
122. QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
(1922). Professor Wright recognized that the President is the sole organ of
official communications between the United States and foreign countries. Id.
§§ 12-17. He also stated that the Executive is the department that negotiates
treaties, id. §§ 176, 252, and recognizes foreign nations, id. §§ 192-95. Insofar
as direct conflicts between a President‟s desires and an act of Congress are
concerned, Professor Wright generally endorsed the traditional American
doctrine of legislative supremacy. Id. §§ 246, 252. Of course, Congress could
not regulate the President‟s exercise of the comparatively narrow range of
foreign powers vested exclusively in the Executive.
Similarly, Wright wrote that the Commander-in-Chief Clause vested the
President with exclusive authority over “the command of the forces and the
conduct of [military] campaigns.” Id. § 221 (quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, J., concurring)). See Barron & Lederman, supra
note 19, at 1018-19. Wright discussed Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804),
see infra app. note 123, elsewhere in his book, see WRIGHT, supra, §§ 104, 218,
but made no attempt to reconcile Little with the President‟s power to
command forces and conduct military campaigns.
Wright supported the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal in public and private, but
never hinted that the Deal could be justified by a preclusive constitutional
authority. See Wright, supra note 92; Letter from Quincy Wright to Charles
C. Burlingham, supra note 21.
123. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804). The case is a classic example
of legislative micromanagement of military operations.
During the
undeclared naval war with France, Congress enacted a statute to the effect
that the Navy could seize ships sailing to French ports but not from French
ports. The President, however, directed the seizure of ships sailing both to
and from French ports. The Court noted that, in the absence of pertinent
acts of Congress, the President‟s duty to enforce law and his commander-inchief power give him a general authority to direct the Navy to seize ships
engaged in illicit commerce. Id. at 177. The Court held, however, that when
Congress has enacted a rule regulating the authority of Navy vessels to seize
ships, the President lacks authority to contravene the statutory rule. Id. at
177-78.
THE
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Executive‟s power in the field of foreign relations is “a very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations—a power which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”124
In the exercise of this power the Executive has not
hesitated in the past to acquire territory and concessions from
foreign nations without express congressional authority.
Notable examples in this field were the Louisiana Purchase in
, the purchase of Florida in
, and the acquisition of
the Panama Canal Zone in
. In all of these instances,
and in many others, the President acted without authority
from the Congress, relying solely upon his constitutional
authority.
In view of the above, it is my opinion that you have full
authority to acquire the naval and air bases if in your opinion
such bases are essential to the defense of the United States or
their acquisition is otherwise in the interest of the people of the
United States. The only question remaining is whether in
acquiring these bases you have a right to direct that old
destroyers of the United States Navy be transferred in
exchange for them. Since the power to acquire includes the
power to give compensation, you unquestionably have such
authority unless the congress in the exercise of constitutional

124. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936) involved Congress‟s constitutional power to delegate authority to the
President to declare an embargo on the sale of arms to countries engaged in a
bloody and seemingly pointless war in South America. See William Casto,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 107 (David Tanenhaus ed., 2008); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 195, 195-232 (Christopher Schroeder & Curtis
Bradley eds., 2009). Among other things, the congressional delegation
required the President to consult with and seek the cooperation of other
countries before deciding whether an embargo would be appropriate. CurtisWright, 299 U.S. at 312 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 347, 73rd Cong. (1934)). The
Court‟s reference to “the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations” was based upon John
Marshall‟s well known speech in the House of Representatives. Id. at 320. In
other words, the Curtiss-Wright quote is simply a restatement of the wellestablished doctrine that the President is the sole organ for communicating
with foreign nations. Given the need for communicating with other nations,
a presidential authority to implement the Act‟s embargo provisions made a
good deal of sense.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15

26

390

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

power has enacted legislation prohibiting the proposed transfer
of destroyers.
In view of your constitutional power as Chief Executive
and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, many
authorities hold that the Congress could not by statute limit
your authority in this respect. I find it unnecessary, however,
to pass upon that question. By section 5 of the act of March 3,
1883, 22 Stat. 599 (sec. 492, title 34, U.S.C.), the Congress has
expressly authorized the disposition of vessels of the Navy, and
I think the authority contained in that statute is broad enough
to include the transfer of destroyers here proposed. True, the
first part of that statute prescribes the usual and ordinary
methods of disposition by the Secretary of the Navy, after
appraisal and advertisement [of vessels which have been found
unfit for further use and have been stricken from the navy
register.]125 but the last clause of the statute provides that
“except as otherwise provided by law no vessel of the Navy
shall hereafter be sold in any manner then herein provided, or
for less than such appraised value, unless the President of the
United States shall otherwise direct in writing.” (Underscoring
supplied)
Construing this clause the Supreme Court in
Levinson v. United States, 258 U.S. 198, held that under it “the
power of the President to direct a departure from the statute is
not confined to a sale for less than the appraised value but
extends to the manner of the sale.” The Court further held
that “the word „unless‟ qualifies both the requirements of the
concluding clause.”
I find no statute which expressly repeals section 5 of the
Act of March 3, 1883, nor do I find any which in my opinion
repeals it by implication. It may be suggested that section
14(a) of Public No. 671, approved June 28, 1940, contains such
an implied repeal, but I am unable to agree with that view.
That section reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provision of any other
law, no military or naval weapon, ship, boat,
aircraft, munitions, supplies, or equipment, to
which the United States has title, in whole or in
part, or which have been contracted for, shall
125. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
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hereafter be transferred, exchanged, sold, or
otherwise disposed of in any manner whatsoever
unless the Chief of Naval Operations in the case
of naval material, and the Chief of Staff of the
Army in the case of military materials, shall first
certify that such material is not essential to the
defense of the United States.
It is well settled that implied repeals are not favored and
will not be recognized unless the provisions of the latter act are
clearly in conflict with the provisions of the former. (cite
authorities) I find no such conflict between section 14(a) of
Public No. 671 and section 5 of the set of March 3, 1883. The
more reasonable view is that section 14(a) produces no conflict
but merely creates an additional requirement. This view is
supported by the history of section 7 of Public No. 757,
approved July 19, 1940 (subsequent to the enactment of section
14(a) above), which reads as follows:
No vessel, ship, or boat (except ships‟ boats)
now in the United States Navy or being built or
hereafter built therefor shall be disposed of by
sale or otherwise, or be chartered or scrapped,
except as now provided by law.
As passed by the House, section 7 of the bill which became
Public No. 757 read as follows:
No vessel, ship, or boat now in the United
States Navy, or being built therefor, shall be
disposed of by sale or otherwise, or be chartered
or scrapped, without the consent of the
Congress.”
The Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate amended
the section to read as it now appears in the act, and in
reporting to the Senate on the section said [(S Rept.
):]126

126. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
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The Committee were informed that this
section as approved by the House of
Representatives would prevent the Navy
Department from disposing of small ships‟ boats
without the consent of the Congress. Admiral
Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, suggested that
this section be deleted from the bill and stated
that in his opinion other provisions of law
regarding the sale and disposal of naval vessels
were adequate.
The report then “quoted” as “existing laws on this subject”
section 14(a) of Public No. 671, 76th Cong., approved June 28,
1940, and sections 491 and 492 of title 34, U.S.C. [5 of the act
of March 3, 1883.]127
It is my opinion, therefore, that section 5 of the set of
March 3, 1883, is still controlling, subject, of course, to the
additional requirement imposed by section 14(a) of Public No.
671, approved June 28, 1940.
Under both the language of section 5 of the set of March 3,
1883, and the construction placed thereon by the Supreme
Court, the power of the President to dispose resale of the [old
destroyers]128 Navy in such manner and under such terms and
conditions as he deems best for the interests of the United
States is unlimited, except in so far as it may now be limited by
the requirements of section 14(a) of Public No. 671, approved
June 28, 1940, [and]129 You state that the provisions of that
section have been or will be complied with.
The national defense is of extreme importance to the U.S.
and to its people. It is the constitutional duty of the President
at all times to take such action as he deems necessary to assure
the adequacy of that defense. This duty is no less in time of
peace than in time of war. Unquestionably it is at the present
time imperative. It follows that if in your opinion an exchange
of the old destroyers for naval and air bases in accordance with
the proposal of the Government of Great Britain will enhance

127. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions that replaced the
marked-out words.
128. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
129. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
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or increase the total defense of the U.S., you are not only vested
with full authority but you are also charged with the
constitutional duty to direct the proper officer of the U.S. Govt.
to effect the change.
This view is not in conflict with my recent memorandum to
you holding [advising]130 that the sale and delivery of motor
torpedo boats by an American builder to a belligerent
government would be in conflict with section 3 of title 5 V of
the [Espionage]131 act of June 15, 1917 (sec. 33, title 18,
U.S.C.). That memorandum dealt only with torpedo boats
constructed by American builders to the order of a belligerent
government. The statute involved reads:
During a war in which the United States is a
neutral nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of
the jurisdiction of the United States any vessel
built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war, or
converted from a private vessel into a vessel of
war, with any intent or under any agreement or
contract, written or oral, that such vessel shall be
delivered to a belligerent nation, or to an agent,
officer, or citizen of such nation, or with
reasonable cause to believe that the said vessel
shall or will be employed in the service of any
such belligerent nation after its departure from
the jurisdiction of the United States.
The legislative history of this statute shows that it was
enacted by the Congress for the purpose of making the
statutory law conform to international law. In view of this fact
[Oppenheim in his work on International Law, 5th Edition, Vol.
2, pages 574, et seq., gives the following as the international
law on the question:]132
Whereas a neutral is in no wise obliged by
his duty of impartiality to prevent his subjects
from selling armed vessels to the belligerents,
130. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
131. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
132. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions.
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such armed vessels being merely contraband of
war, a neutral is bound to employ the means at
his disposal to prevent his subjects from
building, fitting out, or arming, to the order of
either belligerent, vessels intended to be used as
men-of-war, and to prevent the departure from
his jurisdiction of any vessel which, by order of
either belligerent, has been adapted to war-like
use.
The difference between selling armed
vessels to belligerents and building them to order
is usually defined in the following ways:
An armed ship, being contraband of war, is
in no wise different from other kinds of
contraband, provided that she is not manned in a
neutral port, so that she can commit hostilities at
once after having reached the open sea. A
subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship, or
arms a merchantman, not to the order of a
belligerent, but intending to sell her to a
belligerent, does not differ from a manufacturer
of arms who intends to sell them to a belligerent.
There is nothing to prevent a neutral from
allowing his subjects to sell armed vessels, and to
deliver them to belligerents, either in a neutral
port or in a belligerent port. In the cases of The
La Santissima Trinidad (1822) and The Meteor
(1866), American courts have recognized this;
and so did the ungratified Declaration of London,
which in Article 22 (10) enumerated as absolute
contraband “warships, including boats, and their
distinctive component parts.”
On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral
builds armed ships to the order of a belligerent,
he prepares the means of naval operations, since
the ships, on sailing outside the neutral
territorial waters and taking in a crew and
ammunition, can at once commit hostilities.
Thus, through the carrying out of the order of the
belligerent, the neutral territory has been made
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the base of naval operation,; and as the duty of
impartiality includes an obligation to prevent
either belligerent from making neutral territory
the base of military or naval operations, a
neutral violates his neutrality by not preventing
his subjects from carrying out an order of a
belligerent for the building and fitting out of
men-of-war.
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